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Defendant about Other 
Witnesses
By stephen a. saltzBurg
A number of federal and state courts have ad-dressed the question of whether it is permis-sible for the prosecution to cross-examine 
a defendant on the stand as to whether or not the 
defendant believes that the government’s witnesses 
are lying. As a result of the common practice of se-
questering witnesses, the defendant is often the only 
potential witness to hear all other witnesses in the 
case, and, thus, is the only witness who can opine 
about the testimony of other witnesses. Since the 
government has completed its case-in-chief before 
any defense witness testifies, there is no opportunity 
for a defense lawyer to ask a government witness, 
even one who is exempt from sequestration (a rep-
resentative of the government under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 615, for example), about the testimony of 
defense witnesses—unless the witness is recalled dur-
ing rebuttal and questioning about the witness’s be-
liefs concerning the credibility of defense witnesses 
is within the scope of redirect examination. Thus, 
those courts that have addressed the question have 
asked whether or not it is fair to single out the testi-
fying defendant for this type of cross-examination.
United States v. Schmitz: the charges
United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 
2011), is one of the cases to have addressed the 
question most recently. Suzanne L. Schmitz was a 
former Alabama state legislator who was charged 
with and convicted of three counts of mail fraud 
and four counts of theft concerning a program re-
ceiving federal funds. The prosecution alleged and 
proved that Schmitz abused her position as a state 
legislator to obtain employment with the federally 
funded Community Intensive Treatment for Youth 
Program for at-risk youth where she collected over 
$177,000 in salary and other benefits. The govern-
ment’s case rested on proof that she performed 
little or no work and rarely even showed up at the 
office. Schmitz took the salary but generated virtu-
ally no services or work product.
During the first month of her employment, for 
example, a computer technician set up her work 
computer and left a note with her username and 
password in a sealed envelope in her desk draw-
er. Approximately a month later, the technician 
found the sealed envelope was still in the drawer—
Schmitz had not used the computer. Despite the 
almost complete failure to perform, she managed 
to obtain a flexible work schedule, which made it 
more difficult to track her performance, and sub-
mitted false and fraudulent statements regarding 
both how many hours she worked and what and 
how much she produced.
the Defendant testified
Schmitz took the stand in her own defense and 
testified on direct examination. Her testimony 
contradicted that of government witnesses, and 
the prosecution cross-examined by asking her 
whether she contended that the government wit-
nesses were lying:
Q  (prosecutor): [L]et’s get a list going of every-
body you say is lying, okay? Seth Hammett. 
He’s a liar?
A  (defendant): I said I—what I answered was my 
answer is different from his. I never called him 
a liar.
Q:  Did he tell the truth when he said that you 
came to him and asked him to put money in 
the budget to fund your job?
A: No, he did not.
Q: He lied?
A: I never used the word “lie.”
Q: Why not?
A: I just don’t like the word.
Q:  So he didn’t tell the truth. Does that make 
you feel better?
(Id. at 1267.)
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The prosecutor named 12 witnesses who had tes-
tified in the case and asked Schmitz if they should 
be added to the “list” of purported liars. Schmitz re-
sponded each time much as she did in the exchange 
above. According to the court of appeals, the pros-
ecutor repeatedly questioned her until he was able 
to force her to say whether a previous witness was 
telling the truth or should be added to the “liar list.” 
The prosecutor referred during closing arguments 
to the list of purported lying witnesses and argued 
that the jury should reject the notion that 17 people 
lied and only the defendant told the truth. 
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecu-
tor’s cross-examination or to the closing argu-
ment. Thus, on appeal Schmitz could obtain only 
plain error review.
the impropriety of the cross-examination
The court of appeals noted that most federal 
courts that have examined the issue have found 
that it is improper for a prosecutor to question a 
defendant about the credibility of other witnesses 
because determining credibility is the province of 
the jury rather than the parties. The court went 
on to offer four reasons why this type of cross-
examination should be prohibited.
First, the court found that the questions put by 
the prosecutor were barred by the Federal Rules 
of Evidence:
While Rule 608(a) permits a witness to tes-
tify, in the form of opinion or reputation 
evidence, that another witness has a general 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
that rule does not permit a witness to testify 
that another witness was truthful or not on a 
specific occasion. Moreover, the were-they-
lying questions have little or no probative 
value because they seek an answer beyond 
the personal knowledge of the witness. . . . 
The were-they-lying questions are also not 
relevant because one witness’s opinion that 
another person has or has not lied does not 
make it more or less likely that the person 
actually lied. Fed. R. Evid. 401. And, the 
were-they-lying questions distract the jury 
from the central task of determining what 
version of events is accurate in order to de-
termine a defendant’s guilt or innocence.
(Id. at 1268–69.)
Second, the court agreed with other federal ap-
peals courts that such cross-examination invaded 
the province of the jury. Only the jury is to deter-
mine whether or not witnesses are lying.
Third, such questions “ignore other possible 
explanations for inconsistent testimony” that 
“can conflict for many reasons that do not involve 
a deliberate intent to deceive. There may be lapses 
in memory, differences in perception, or a genu-
ine misunderstanding.” These “questions ignore 
all of these innocent explanations, and put the 
testifying defendant in a ‘no-win’ situation: The 
defendant must either accuse another witness 
of lying or undermine his or her own version of 
events.” (Id. at 1269.)
Fourth, such questions,
are argumentative, and often their primary 
purpose is to make the defendant appear 
accusatory. . . . The very structure of the 
question is designed to pit the testifying 
witness against every other adverse witness, 
suggesting to the jury that someone is de-
liberately deceiving the court and the jury 
must choose the culprit. While the jury must 
make credibility assessments in determining 
guilt or innocence, the were-they-lying ques-
tions do not serve this function but preju-
dicially force the testifying defendant to 
accuse or not. Even worse, the defendant’s 
answer often does not matter because the 
predominate purpose of such questions is 
to make the defendant look bad.
(Id. (citations omitted).)
The court expressed no concern that its rul-
ing, and those of the other courts that had barred 
similar cross-examination, would unduly restrict 
prosecutors. The court agreed that “it is often 
necessary on cross-examination to focus a wit-
ness on the differences and similarities between 
his testimony and that of another witness” and 
had no difficulty concluding that “[t]his is per-
missible provided he is not asked to testify as to 
the veracity of the other witness.” (Id. (quoting 
United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 
2006)).) The court also recognized that in a par-
ticular case a defendant might open the door to 
questions about other witnesses possibly lying.
The Schmitz court also held that the prosecutor’s 
comments during closing argument were improper 
but presented a closer question because “an attor-
ney’s statements that indicate his opinion or knowl-
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 scientific eviDence
edge of the case as theretofore presented before the 
court and jury are permissible if the attorney makes 
it clear that the conclusions he is urging are conclu-
sions to be drawn from the evidence.” (Id. at 1270 
(quoting United States v. Johns, 734 F.2d 657, 663 
(11th Cir. 1984)).) Although the court recognized 
that a prosecutor may be justified in arguing during 
closing argument that a particular witness is lying 
where such an inference is supported by the evi-
dence in the cases, the court concluded that the ar-
gument as to Schmitz was improper because “they 
were a clear continuation of the improper questions 
posed previously during Schmitz’s cross-examina-
tion.” (Id.) The court observed that the prosecutor 
emphasized in closing argument the concept of a 
“liar list” that had been improperly developed dur-
ing Schmitz’s cross-examination.
the result on appeal
Although the Schmitz opinion puts prosecutors 
on notice of the general impermissibility of ques-
tioning a testifying defendant about whether other 
witnesses are truthful or untruthful, the opinion 
is also a reminder to defense counsel of the im-
portance of raising timely and specific objections 
because the court ultimately found that there was 
no plain error in Schmitz. The court observed that 
neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Cir-
cuit had opined on the propriety of the type of 
questions at issue prior to the decision in Schmitz.
Ultimately the court affirmed the mail fraud 
convictions, but held, 2–1 that defects in the in-
dictment required reversal of the convictions for 
theft relating to a program receiving federal funds.
lessons
1. Even where the law is not well established, it is 
important for counsel to object to questions that 
appear to violate applicable evidence rules. In 
Schmitz, for example, the court pointed out that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) limits the type of 
testimony that may be admitted with respect to a 
witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness. An objection that the prosecutor’s questions 
violated Rule 608 might well have caused the trial 
judge to consider carefully whether such ques-
tions could legitimately be asked.
2. It is now clear that prosecutors in the nor-
mal case in the Eleventh Circuit (and probably in 
most other places) may not ask a testifying defen-
dant to opine on the credibility of other witnesses. 
The overwhelming majority of federal and state 
courts have reached the same conclusion not only 
because of rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 
608(a), but also because it seems very clear that 
courts would not permit the defense to have the 
defendant offer an opinion that defense witnesses 
were testifying truthfully. Although the Supreme 
Court and the Eleventh Circuit may not have 
spoken to the precise question prior to Schmitz, 
the law throughout the United States was clear 
enough that one witness in a trial could not go 
beyond offering opinion or reputation testimony 
and opine as to whether another witness was tell-
ing the truth on a particular occasion. It is just a 
little clearer as a result of the Schmitz decision.
3. Like most general rules, the prohibition on 
the questions asked in Schmitz is always subject 
to an exception when a defendant opens the door 
by voluntary testimony on direct examination. A 
defendant who volunteers testimony that other 
witnesses are lying is subject to cross-examination 
that may address the defendant’s opinion about 
these other witnesses. n
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